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determinants of participation in Hezbollah militant activities in Lebanon.  The evidence we have
assembled suggests that having a living standard above the poverty line or a secondary school or higher
education is positively associated with participation in Hezbollah.  We also find that Israeli Jewish settlers
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to participation in, and support for, terrorism.
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Introduction 
That investment in education is critical for economic growth, improved health, 
and social progress is beyond question.  That poverty is a scourge that the international 
aid community and industrialized countries should work to eradicate is also beyond 
question.  What is less clear, however, is whether poverty and low education are root 
causes of terrorism.  This paper investigates whether there is a causal link between 
poverty or low education and support for terrorist activities and politically motivated 
violence. 
In the aftermath of the tragic events of September 11
th, several prominent 
observers – ranging from former United States Presidential candidate George McGovern 
to President George W. Bush, as well as academics, including Joseph Nye, Dean of the 
Kennedy School of Government, Laura Tyson, Dean of the London Business School, and 
Richard Sokolsky and Joseph McMillan of the National Defense University – have called 
for increased aid and educational assistance to end terrorism.
1  Perhaps surprisingly, our 
review of the evidence provides little reason for optimism that a reduction in poverty or 
an increase in educational attainment, by themselves, would meaningfully reduce 
international terrorism.  Any connection between poverty, education and terrorism is 
indirect, complicated and probably quite weak.  Instead of viewing terrorism as a direct 
response to low market opportunities or ignorance, we suggest it is more accurately 
viewed as a response to political conditions and long-standing feelings (either perceived 
or real) of indignity and frustration that have little to do with economics.   
                                                           
1 After refraining from drawing a connection between poverty and terrorism for a time, on March 23, 2002 
President Bush announced in Monterrey, Mexico, “We fight against poverty because hope is an answer to 
terror.”  See Laura Tyson, “It’s Time to Step Up the Global War on Poverty” Business Week, Dec. 3, 2001, 
Richard Sokolsky and Joseph McMillan, “Foreign Aid in our Own Defense,” New York Times Op-ed,   2
An understanding of the causes of terrorism is essential if an effective strategy is 
to be crafted to combat it.  Moreover, drawing a connection between poverty and 
terrorism if it is not justified is potentially quite dangerous as the international aid 
community may lose interest in providing support to developing nations when the 
imminent threat of terrorism recedes, much like support for development waned in the 
aftermath of the Cold War.  And connecting foreign aid with terrorism risks the 
possibility of humiliating many in less developed countries, who are implicitly told they 
only receive aid to prevent them from committing acts of terror.  Furthermore, premising 
foreign aid on the threat of terrorism could create perverse incentives in which some 
groups are induced to engage in terrorism to increase their prospect of receiving aid.  In 
our view, alleviating poverty is reason enough to pressure economically advanced 
countries to provide more aid than they are currently giving.  
To make any headway investigating the determinants of terrorism, one must have 
a working definition of terrorism.  This is a difficult task.  More than 100 diplomatic or 
scholarly definitions exist.  The types of activities by various groups considered terrorist 
acts differ substantially across the definitions.  The term terrorism has also evolved over 
time.  When first used in a political context during the French Revolution, the term was 
reserved for accusations against those who, like Robespierre, made use of violence in the 
name of the state.  By the late 19
th Century, however, Russian and French anarchists 
proudly used the term terrorism to describe their violent endeavors against the state.  Part 
of the difficulty in defining terrorism is that there are valid disputes as to which party is a 
legitimate government.  During World War II, for example, the German occupation 
                                                                                                                                                                             
February 12, 2002, and George McGovern, “The Healing in Helping the World’s Poor,” New York Times 
Op-ed, January 1, 2002.     3
forces labeled members of resistance groups as terrorists.  “One man’s terrorist,” the 
saying goes, “is another’s freedom fighter.”   
There is a range of possible definitions.  On the one hand, the U.S. State 
Department, which acknowledges that no single definition of terrorism has gained 
universal acceptance, seems to capture what is considered terrorism by many 
governments and international organizations.  Since 1983, the State Department has 
employed the following definition for statistical and analytical purposes:  
The term ‘terrorism’ means premeditated, politically motivated 
violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational 
groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience. 
 
The term ‘international terrorism’ means terrorism involving citizens 
or the territory of more than one country. 
 
The State Department also specifies that “the term noncombatant is interpreted to 
include, in addition to civilians, military personnel who at the time of the incident are 
unarmed and/or not on duty. … We also consider as acts of terrorism attacks on military 
installations or on armed military personnel when a state of military hostilities does not 
exist at the site, such as bombings against U.S. bases in the Persian Gulf, Europe, or 
elsewhere.”  The rub, of course, is that the definition of “subnational” and “military 
hostilities” leaves much latitude for disagreement.   
On the other hand, definitions used by scholars tend to place more emphasis on 
the intention of terrorists to cause fear and terror among a target audience with the aim of 
persuasion that transcends the harm caused to the immediate victims.  Scholarly 
definitions often also include nation states as potential perpetrators of terrorism.   
Rather than dogmatically adhere to one definition, we analyze involvement in, or 
support for, activities that, at least when judged by some parties, constitute terrorism.    4
Nevertheless, in the incidents analyzed in our paper the line between terrorism and 
resistance is often blurred; indeed, in the case of Hezbollah in the 1980s we think it is fair 
to say that terrorism was a tactic sometimes used in resistance against an occupying 
force.  A similar statement could be made about Palestinian militance.  At the least, 
however, all of the cases we examine could be thought of as involving politically 
motivated violence.  Moreover, it is reassuring that our main conclusions appear to hold 
across a varying set of circumstances, cultures and countries.   
We do not examine state terrorism because we suspect the process underlying 
participation in state terrorism is quite different than the process underlying substate 
terrorism, and would involve a different type of analysis.  We do not dispute, however, 
that state terrorism exists, and has at times generated substate terrorism as a response.   
In the next section we provide an overview of theoretical considerations involved 
in the decision to participate in terrorist-type activities.  As is conventional in economics, 
involvement in terrorism is viewed as a rational decision, depending on the benefits, costs 
and risks involved from engagement in terrorism compared to other activities.  Not 
surprisingly, the standard rational choice framework does not yield an unambiguous 
answer to the question of whether higher income and more education would reduce 
participation in terrorism.   
  Evidence on the determinants of terrorism is just beginning to be assembled. The 
second section of our paper considers evidence on “hate crimes,” which we argue can be 
viewed as a close cousin to terrorism in that the target of the offense is selected because 
of his or her group identity, not their individual behavior, and because the effect of both 
is to wreak terror in a wider audience than those directly affected.  A consensus is   5
emerging in the social science literature that the incidence of hate crimes, such as 
lynchings of African Americans or violence against Turks in Germany, bears little 
relation to economic conditions.   
  The third section considers data from a public opinion poll conducted in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR).  
In December 2001, Palestinians were asked whether they support attacks on Israeli 
civilian and military targets, and about whether they considered certain events acts of 
terrorism.  We report breakdowns of the data by education and occupation.  These results 
indicate that support for violence against Israeli targets is widespread in the Palestinian 
population, and at least as great among those with higher education and higher living 
standards as it is among the unemployed and illiterate.   
  The fourth section contains the main new contribution of our paper, a statistical 
analysis of the determinants of participation in Hezbollah in Lebanon.  We analyze a 
sample of data that combines information on 129 members of Hezbollah who were killed 
primarily while involved in paramilitary actions in the late 1980s and early 1990s with a 
general population survey of similarly aged individuals in Lebanon.  We find that 
education and poverty are statistically insignificant predictors of whether individuals 
become martyrs for Hezbollah.  Indeed, having a standard of living above the poverty 
line or a secondary-school education or higher is positively associated with participation 
in Hezbollah.  The results are consistent with the biographical evidence assembled for 
Palestinian suicide bombers.   
  The fifth section presents a summary of the backgrounds of 27 Israeli Jews who 
were involved in terrorist activities in the Occupied Territories in the early 1980s.  These   6
individuals, who planted bombs and attempted to assassinate Palestinian mayors, are 
remarkably well educated and drawn from well paying occupations.  
  In the sixth section we present an analysis of the incidence of major terrorist acts 
(cited in the International Encyclopedia of Terrorism) over time in Israel.  Specifically, 
we relate the number of terrorist acts each year to the rate of economic growth in that 
year or in the recent past.   
  The data on participation and support for political violence, militance and/or 
terrorism that we examine are meager, often indirect, and possibly nonrepresentative.  In 
addition, participation in terrorist activities may be highly context-specific, and we only 
examine terrorism, militance and politically motivated violence in a small number of 
settings primarily in the Middle East.  Consequently, our results must be considered 
tentative and exploratory.  Nonetheless, we are not aware of compelling evidence that 
points in the opposite direction from what we have found.  In light of our results and the 
literature, we would urge intellectuals and policy makers to exercise caution in presuming 
that poverty and education have a direct, causal impact on terrorism.   
 
1.  Theoretical Considerations of Participation in Terrorism 
A simple view of terrorism is that participation in terrorism is akin to participation 
in crime in general.  Economists have a well worked out and empirically successful 
theory of participation in criminal activities.  As emphasized by Becker (1968), 
individuals should choose to allocate their time between working in the legal job market 
or working in criminal activities in such a way that maximizes their utility.  After 
accounting for the risk of being caught and penalized, the size of the penalty, and any 
stigma or moral distress associated with involvement in crime, those who receive higher   7
income from criminal activities would choose involvement in crime.  In this model, crime 
increases as one’s market wage falls relative to the rewards associated with crime, and 
decreases if the risk of being apprehended after committing a crime or the penalty for 
being convicted of a crime rises.   
  Available evidence suggests that individuals are more likely to commit property 
crimes if they have lower wages or less education.
2  The occurrence of violent crimes, 
including murders, however, is typically found to be unrelated to economic 
opportunities.
3   
Landes (1978) and Sandler, et al. (1983) apply the economic model of crime to 
transnational terrorism.  They focus on how an increase in penalties and law enforcement 
influences the incentive to partake in terrorist activities.  The economic model, however, 
yields few concrete predictions insofar as the relationship between market opportunities 
and participation in terrorism is concerned because participation in terrorist acts by 
individuals with different characteristics depends on the probability that participation will 
bring about the desired political change, and the differential payoff for the various groups 
associated with achieving the terrorists’ desired aims versus the penalties associated with 
failure.  For example, it is possible that well educated individuals will disproportionately 
participate in terrorist groups if they think that they will assume leadership positions if 
they succeed, or if they identify more strongly with the goals of the terrorist organization 
than less educated individuals.    
Other important considerations include the relative pay of skilled and unskilled 
individuals for participation in terrorist organizations and how it compares to relative pay 
                                                           
2 See, for example, Ehrlich (1973), Freeman (1996), and Piehl (1998). 
3 See, for example, Piehl (1998) and Ruhm (2000).     8
in the legal sector, and the selection of terrorists by terrorist organizations from the pool 
of potential applicants.  Keller (2002) reported that Iraq decided to increase the payment 
to families of suicide bombers from $10,000 to $25,000 in March 2002 in the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip.  In the month after that decision, suicide bombings increased, although it 
is unclear whether the connection is causal.   
Even before the increase in the payment to families of suicide bombers, Nasra 
Hassan (2001) reported that there was an excess supply of willing suicide bombers.  
Between 1996 and 1999, Ms. Hassan, a relief worker for the U.N., interviewed nearly 
250 militants and associates of militants involved in the Palestinian cause, including 
failed suicide bombers, the families of deceased bombers, and those who trained and 
prepared suicide bombers for their missions.
4  One Hamas leader Ms. Hassan interviewed 
said, “Our biggest problem is the hordes of young men who beat on our doors, clamoring 
to be sent [on suicide missions].  It is difficult to select only a few.”  Another senior 
member of Hamas’s al-Qassam said, “The selection process is complicated by the fact 
that so many wish to embark on this journey of honor. When one is selected, countless 
others are disappointed.”  Thus, the demand side is also part of the equation.   
With a queue of willing participants, how do terrorist or militant groups choose 
their suicide bombers?  A planner for Islamic Jihad explained to Ms. Hassan that his 
group scrutinizes the motives of a potential bomber to be sure that the individual is 
committed to carrying out the task.
5  A high level of educational attainment is probably a 
signal of one’s commitment to a cause and determination, as well as of one’s ability to 
                                                           
4 Ms. Hassan reported that the sponsoring terrorist organization usually gave between $3,000 and $5,000 to 
the families of suicide bombers.  Apart from that payment, she reported that the typical cost of the 
operation was around $150.     9
prepare for an assignment and carry it off, so the stereotype of suicide bombers being 
drawn from the ranks of those who are so impoverished that they have nothing to live for 
may be 180 degrees off base.  This interpretation is also consistent with another of Ms. 
Hassan’s observations about suicide bombers:  
None of them were uneducated, desperately poor, simple minded or 
depressed. Many were middle class and, unless they were fugitives, 
held paying jobs.  More than half of them were refugees from what is 
now Israel.  Two were the sons of millionaires.  
 
  Suicide bombers are clearly not motivated by the prospect of their own 
individual economic gain, although it is possible that the promise of larger payments to 
their families may increase the willingness of some to participate in suicide bombing 
missions.  We suspect their primary motivation  instead results from their passionate 
support for the ultimate aims and desires of their movement.  Nassra Hassan, for 
example, reported, “Over and over, I heard them say, ‘The Israelis humiliate us. They 
occupy our land, and deny our history.’”  Eradication of poverty and universal high 
school education are unlikely to change these feelings.  Indeed, it is even possible that 
those who are well off and well educated perceive such feelings more acutely.
6   
Economic theory is unlikely to give a very convincing answer one way or the 
other as to whether poverty or education are important root causes of terrorism.  One 
could construct plausible explanations for why a reduction in poverty and a rise in 
education might increase or decrease the incidence of terrorism.  Next we turn to a broad 
consideration of evidence related to terrorism.   
                                                                                                                                                                             
5 Ms. Hassan also observed that the groups generally reject for suicide bombing missions “those who are 
under eighteen, who are the sole wage earners in their families, or who are married and have family 
responsibilities.”     
6 Observe, for example, that well educated and high-income people are consistently more likely to vote than  
are less educated and poor people.  If the primary payoff motivating people to join and support terrorist   10
 
2.  Evidence from Hate Crimes 
Because the literature on participation in terrorism is less well developed than the 
literature on “hate crimes,” we begin by briefly reviewing evidence on the economic 
determinants of hate crimes, a phenomenon that many have considered closely related to 
terrorism (e.g., Hamm, 1998 and Kressell, 1996).  Hate crimes are commonly defined as 
crimes against members of religious, racial or ethnic groups because of their group 
membership, rather than their characteristics or actions as individuals.  Hate crimes 
include acts of violence, as well as destruction of property, harassment and trespassing.  
Until recently, social scientists thought economic deprivation was a crucial determinant 
of hate crimes.  New evidence, however, strongly challenges the empirical basis for this 
conclusion.
7  A new consensus is emerging that views hate crimes as independent of 
economic deprivation. 
 The original empirical support for the “economic deprivation hypothesis” 
stemmed mainly from historical evidence on anti-black lynchings in the southern part of 
the United States.  In his 1933 classic study, The Tragedy of Lynching, Arthur Raper 
documented a correlation of -0.532 between the number of lynchings in a year and the 
value of an acre of cotton (a measure of economic conditions) in that year using annual 
time-series data from 1882 to 1930.  He concluded that, “periods of relative prosperity 
bring reduction in lynching and periods of depression cause an increase.”  The 
psychologists Carl Hovland and Robert Sears (1940) seized on this finding as support for 
                                                                                                                                                                             
organizations is the potential to influence political change, then it would not be surprising if education and 
income have the same effect on participation in terrorism as they do on participation in voting. 
7 See Green, McFalls, and Smith (2001) for a good survey of the literature.   11
the view that intergroup antagonism results from frustration accompanying economic 
contractions.   
A landmark study by Green, Glaser and Rich (1998) overturns that conclusion.  
First, they showed that the correlation between lynchings and economic conditions 
vanished once secular trends in both variables were taken into account. That is, apart 
from the long-term tendency for the number of lynchings to decline and the economy to 
grow, lynchings were unrelated to year-to-year economic fluctuations.  Second, when 
they use Simon Kuznets’s measure of real per capita GNP growth (which was 
unavailable to Raper) as a measure of economic conditions instead of the price of cotton, 
they find that lynchings and economic conditions are virtually uncorrelated.   
Third, and most important, Raper’s sample ended just before the Great 
Depression.  Lynchings did not rise during the Great Depression, despite the dramatic 
deterioration in economic conditions.  When Green, Glaser and Rich extend the original 
sample through 1938, they find an insignificant correlation between the number of anti-
black lynchings and the value of an acre of cotton, and a positive correlation between 
anti-black lynchings and real GNP growth.  It is almost certainly the case that the inverse 
correlation reported between economic conditions and anti-black lynchings that launched 
the aggression-frustration hypothesis was spurious, a coincidence of two unrelated trends 
that happened to move in the opposite direction at the turn of the 20
th Century.   
Moreover, the evidence of a connection between economic conditions and other 
types of hate crimes in contemporary data is also elusive. Green, Glaser and Rich (1998) 
report time-series evidence on the incidence of hate crimes against blacks, Jews, Asians 
and gay men and lesbians using data from New York City each month from 1987 to   12
1995.  They found that the incidence of these crimes was unrelated to the city's 
unemployment rate.  
Across regions in a given year, the occurrence of hate crimes and prevalence of 
hate groups are also found to be unrelated to economic circumstances of the area.  
Jefferson and Pryor (1999), for example, examined determinants of the existence of hate 
groups across counties in the United States in 1997, using a list of hate groups assembled 
by the Southern Poverty Law Center.  Specifically, they used logistic regressions to relate 
the characteristics of counties to the likelihood that the county was home to a chapter of a 
hate group.  About 10 percent of the 3,100 counties in the continental United States 
contained one or more hate group, like the Klu Klux Klan.  The existence of hate groups 
was unrelated to the unemployment rate, divorce rate, percent black, or gap in per capita 
income between whites and blacks in the county.  The share of the adult population with 
a high school diploma or higher had a statistically significant,  positive association with 
the probability that a hate group was located in the area.  They concluded that, “economic 
or sociological explanations for the existence of hate groups in an area are far less 
important than adventitious circumstances due to history and particular conditions.”   
The findings for the United States do not appear to be unique. Germany 
experienced a rash of violence against foreigners in the early 1990's. Unemployment was 
high, particularly in the former East Germany.  Krueger and Pischke (1997), however, 
found no relationship between the unemployment rate and the incidence of ethnic 
violence across 543 counties in Germany, once they controlled for a dummy variable 
indicating whether the county was located in the former East or West Germany. 
Likewise, average education and the average manufacturing wage in the county was   13
unrelated to the amount of violence against foreigners. Within the former East Germany, 
those counties located furthest from the west had the highest incidence of ethnic violence.  
Krueger and Pischke attribute the geographic pattern to a failure of law enforcement 
further east, and pent up animosity that was suppressed during Communism.   
To summarize, neither cyclical downturns nor longer-term regional disparities in 
living standards appear to be correlated with the incidence of a wide range of hate crimes. 
This is not proof of the absence of a causal relationship, but if there were a direct causal 
effect one would expect hate crimes to rise during periods of economic hardship.  Rather 
than economic conditions, the hate crimes literature points to a breakdown in law 
enforcement and official sanctioning and encouragement of civil disobedience as 
significant causes of the occurrence of hate crimes.   
 
3.  Evidence from Public Opinion Polls in the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
Although public opinion polls are subject to multiple interpretations, such data can 
provide indirect information about which segments of the population support terrorist or 
militant activities.  Here we analyze public opinion data collected by the Palestinian 
Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR), an independent, nonprofit institution 
and think tank located in Ramallah that performs policy analysis and academic research 
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  We should emphasize that these results are 
undoubtedly highly context specific, due to the long lasting Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
and due to the fact that Palestinians are without a state or army and are highly dependent 
economically on Israel.   
The PCPSR conducted a public opinion poll of 1,357 Palestinians age 18 or older in 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip on December 19-24, 2001.  The survey, which was   14
conducted by in-person interviews, covered topics including views toward the September 
11
th attacks in the United States, support for an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement, and 
views toward armed attacks against Israel.
8  Under trying circumstances in the midst of 
one of the worst periods of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Ayoub Mustafa of the Center 
kindly provided us with tabulations of key questions broken down by the educational 
level and occupational status of the respondents.   
Tables 1 and 2 provide a summary of the results.  The questions are presented in the 
order in which they were asked in the survey, so the reader can gauge context and order 
effects (although results are not available for all questions, so there are some gaps in the 
questions).  
Several findings are evident.  First, the support for armed attacks against Israeli 
targets by the Palestinian population is widespread (Q18).  It is important to emphasize, 
however, the distinction between support for armed attacks expressed in a public opinion 
poll at a particular point in time and participation in such attacks.   
Second, a majority of the Palestinian population believes that armed attacks against 
Israeli civilians have helped achieve Palestinian rights in a way that negotiations could 
not have (Q17).  This finding raises obvious implications concerning the difficulty of 
ending the attacks, and may partially account for the opposition to a United Nations 
initiative to fight terrorism (see Q21).  If the Palestinian public believes the attacks are 
efficacious, they are unlikely to cease supporting additional attacks unless their demands 
are met.  Another question (Q19, not shown in table) asked, “To what extent do you 
support or oppose the position taken by President Arafat and the PA regarding the U.S. 
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campaign against terror?”  Thirty-six percent supported or strongly supported the position 
of President Arafat in this case, and 50.4 percent opposed it.   
Third, a majority of the Palestinian population did not consider suicide bombings, like 
the one that killed 21 Israeli youths at the Dolphinarium night club in Tel Aviv, terrorist 
events (Q22-5).  Toward the end of the questionnaire, respondents were also asked 
whether they thought the international community considered the Dolphinarium bombing 
a terrorist event (Q23-5, not shown).  Ninety-two percent responded yes.  These results 
highlight differences in interpreting the meaning of the word terrorism.   
Fourth, and important for our purposes, there is no evidence in these results that more 
highly educated individuals are less supportive of violent attacks against Israeli targets 
than are those who are illiterate or poorly educated.  Consider, for example, the 
percentage of individuals who say they support or strongly support armed attacks against 
Israeli targets less those who say they oppose or strongly oppose such attacks.  By a 68 
percentage point margin those with more than a secondary school education support 
armed attacks against Israeli targets, while the margin is 46 points for those who are 
illiterate and 63 points for those with an elementary school education.  A chi-square 
goodness-of-fit test decisively rejects the null hypothesis that responses to the question 
concerning support for armed attacks against Israel (Q18) are independent of educational 
attainment (p-value = 0.004).  
A survey conducted by PCPSR in November 1994, before the current intifada, asked 
respondents whether they supported a dialogue between Hamas and Israel (see 
www.pcpsr.org/survey/cprspolls/94/poll13a.html).  Responses were reported by 
educational attainment.  More highly educated respondents were less supportive of a   16
dialogue with Israel: 53 percent of those with a BA and 40 percent of those with an MA 
or Ph.D. supported a dialogue, compared with 60 percent of those with a 9 years or less 
of schooling.  (Based on other questions, it is clear that supporters of dialogue generally 
favored a more peaceful coexistence with Israel.)   
Fifth, support for armed attacks against Israeli targets is widespread across all 
occupations and groups, but particularly strong among students (recall that respondents 
are age 18 or older) and merchants, farmers and professionals.  (Only 22 respondents 
were farmers, and some may own farms, so we included them with merchants and 
professionals.)  Notably, the unemployed are somewhat less likely to support armed 
attacks against Israeli military, and especially civilian, targets.  If poverty was the 
wellspring of support for terrorism or politically motivated violence, one would have 
expected the unemployed to be more supportive of armed attacks than merchants and 
professionals, not less.   
Sixth, notice that housewives’ responses are quite similar to those of the general 
public. The attitudes of the housewives exhibited in the PCPSR survey are significant in 
part because they are likely to have substantial influence on their children’s views and 
activities.   
Seventh, the survey found that the Palestinian population doubted bin Laden’s role in 
the September 11
th attacks on New York.  A subsequent poll by the Gallup Organization 
of adults in nine countries in the Islamic world also found considerable skepticism toward 
the role of bin Laden’s group in the attacks on New York and Washington.  For example, 
74 percent of Muslim Lebanese did not believe news reports that groups of Arabs carried 
out the attacks.  In contrast, 65 percent of Christian Lebanese accepted the veracity of the   17
news reports.  Respondents in the PCPSR survey were divided on whether they defined 
as a “terrorist event” the “destruction of the Twin Towers in New York City by people 
suspected to be members of Bin Laden’s organization”: 41.4 percent agreed and 53.1 
percent disagreed.  
 
Economic Expectations 
It is possible to use public opinion data to infer trends in economic expectations.  On 
three occasions – in July/August 1998, September 1999, and February 2000 – PCPSR 
asked respondents in the West Bank and Gaza Strip the following two questions: “How 
would you describe your economic situation over the last three years compared to the 
situation today?  Better, Worse, Stayed the Same, or Don’t Know?” and “Are you 
optimistic or pessimistic regarding your economic situation over the next three years?  
Optimistic, Pessimistic,  It will remain the same,  No Opinion/Don't Know?”  Tabulations 
of responses to these two questions, as well as the unemployment rate, which is available 
with more frequency, are shown in Table 3.   
The survey results indicate that between 1998 and 2000 the public perceived 
economic conditions to be improving, and optimism for the future was rising.  The 
downward trend in the unemployment rate is also consistent with this interpretation of 
economic circumstances.  There is little evidence here to suggest that a deteriorating 
economy or falling expectations for the economy precipitated the latest intifada, which 
began in September 2000, although it is possible that expectations could have changed 
between the PCPSR’s last survey and the start of the intifada.   
Angrist (1995) closely examines trends in school enrollment, earnings and 
unemployment by level of education in a period encompassing the intifada in 1988.  He   18
finds that college enrollment in the West Bank and Gaza Strip increased rapidly in the 
early 1980s, doubling between 1981 and 1985.  Between 1982 and 1988 the number of 
Palestinian men in the labor force with 12 or more years of schooling doubled, while the 
number with 11 or fewer years of schooling increased only around 30 percent.  This 
remarkable rise in the education of the workforce coincided with a sharp increase in the 
unemployment rate for college graduates relative to high school graduates in the 1980s.  
In addition, from 1985 to 1988 the real daily wage of college graduates fell by around 30 
percent, while the real wage of those with 12 years of schooling held steady and the real 
wage of those with 11 or fewer years of schooling increased slightly. Angrist notes that 
the decline in Palestinian school enrollment in the early 1990s probably represents “a 
belated supply response to low returns to schooling.”   
Thus, the noteworthy increase in educational attainment of Palestinians in the 1980s 
coincided with a marked deterioration in the economic position of more highly educated 
Palestinians.  Angrist and others speculate that the deterioration in economic 
opportunities for the highly educated contributed to the civil unrest that broke out in 
December 1987.  Angrist notes, however, that the confluence of these developments 
could be unique to the Palestinian situation, and not a universal response to expanding 
educational opportunities.  Importantly, the Israeli occupation of the territories and lack 
of an effective capital market or banking system probably prevented the labor markets in 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip from equilibrating, particularly in light of the fact that 
many Palestinians are dependent on Israel for jobs.  Consequently, the link between an 
expansion in educational attainment, deteriorating economic conditions and protest may 
not generalize.  Indeed, the contrasting economic environments surrounding the intifadas   19
in 1988 and 2000 suggest that protest, violence and even terrorism can follow either a 
rising or declining economic tide.   
 
4.  Correlates of Participation in Hezbollah Militant Activities 
The Hezbollah (or Hizb'allah, Party of God) was founded in Lebanon in 1982, 
following the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon.  The original goal of Hezbollah 
was to fight the Israeli occupation and create a Shiite state in Lebanon, modeled on Iran. 
The organization refrained from publicly claiming responsibility for its actions for three 
years after it was formed, and did not  reveal its name until 1985.  Hezbollah has since 
evolved into a complex social, political and resistance organization, and currently posts a 
web site in English and Arabic (www.hizbollah.org) that describes its multifaceted 
activities.   
Hezbollah is based in three main areas in Lebanon: Beirut, the Bekaa Valley and 
southern Lebanon.  Hezbollah has used various means to achieve its goals.  In the 1980s, 
taking Western hostages proved successful, especially when President Reagan was 
willing to trade arms for hostages.  In the early 1990s, Hezbolah participated in Lebanese 
elections with some success.  Beginning in the 1980s, Hezbollah also introduced suicide 
attacks, first against Israeli military bases in southern Lebanon and later against Western 
soldiers in Beirut.  Hezbollah is believed to be responsible for the suicide truck bombings 
of the U.S. Embassy annex in 1984, and the U.S. marines’ and French paratroopers’ 
barracks in 1983 in Beirut.  The U.S. State Department and British Home Office have 
labeled Hezbollah as a terrorist organization.   
Currently, Hezbollah supports the radical Palestinian movements, Hamas and 
Islamic Jihad, in their campaign against Israel. It is from Hezbollah that these   20
organizations reportedly have adopted the technique of suicide bombings.  It has also 
been reported that Hezbollah and al Qaeda have joined forces after al Qaeda was 
dispersed from Afghanistan.
9   
 
Statistical Analysis of Hezbollah Participation 
Eli Hurvitz of Tel Aviv University graciously provided us with biographical 
information on 129 members of Hezbollah’s military wing (Al-Muqawama Al-Islamiya) 
who died in action from 1982 to 1994.  Two-thirds of the Shahids, or martyrs, were killed 
between 1986 and 1988.  The biographical details were extracted by Hurvitz from articles 
about the deceased fighters in Hezbollah’s weekly newspaper, Al-Ahd.  The observations 
in the sample may make up as many as one third of the members of Hezbollah’s military 
wing in this period, according to Hurvitz.  Hurvitz (1998) used the data to develop a 
profile of Hezbollah, but did not compare the Shahids to the Lebanese population from 
which they were drawn.  We culled a data set from the biographies that included the 
individuals’ age at death, highest level of school attended, poverty status, region of 
residence, and marital status.   
There are at least three problems with the data for our purposes worth emphasizing.  
First, the deceased Hezbollah fighters were involved in a mix of activities, not all of 
which might be classified as terrorist attacks.  An attack on a military post was the most 
common type of activity the individuals were engaged in when they were killed.  Others 
died planting booby traps, or were assassinated by the Israeli Defense Forces or Lebanese 
forces.  Three died in suicide bombing attacks.   
                                                           
9 See Dana Priest and Douglas Farah, “Hezbollah, Al Qaeda Team Up,” Washington Post, June 30, 2002.     21
Second, there are obvious selection bias issues.  It is unclear whether the deceased 
Hezbollah militants who are described in the organization’s newspaper are representative 
of Hezbollah members who engaged in terrorist and paramilitary activities.  Hezbollah 
has a heterogeneous membership, ranging from untrained foot soldiers to well trained 
individuals.  It is possible that the foot soldiers are over represented among the deceased.  
If this is the case, then our sample may under represent highly educated members from 
middle or upper income families.   
Third, relevant information was missing for several individuals, and sometimes we 
were forced to indirectly infer variables from available information.  For example, we 
inferred poverty status from available information on individuals’ family background 
(e.g., parents’ occupation) or from their own economic condition when it was reported, 
but this information was available for fewer than half of all cases.  We tried to define 
poverty in a comparable way to how it was defined in the general population survey 
described below, but we could only do so with partial information so the data may not be 
perfectly comparable.   
Obtaining data on the general population in Lebanon proved to be difficult as well.  
To compare the sample of Hezbollah fighters to the general population of Lebanon, we 
obtained an extract of individual-level data on a small subset of variables from the 
Lebanese Population and Housing Survey (PHS), 1996, conducted by the Administration 
Centrale de la Statistique.  Specifically, we have information on the age, poverty status, 
and highest level of education attended of 287,204 individuals.  Poverty status is defined 
on the basis of 11 living conditions indicators, including rooms per person, principal 
means of heating, water and sewerage access, car ownership, and occupation.  There is no   22
information in the PHS on whether respondents were Hezbollah members.  But because 
we estimate that Hezbollah militants made up only 3 in 10,000 people in the Lebanese 
population (in the relevant age group), we ignore the fact that, in principle, some 
members of the PHS sample may have been Hezbollah members.   
A strength of the PHS data is that the sample is large, and the survey covers a period 
close to the time frame of the Hezbollah sample.  One problem with these data, however, 
is that we were not provided the sex of individuals in the population sample.  All of the 
deceased Hezbollah fighters were male.  Although we readily acknowledge that this is a 
shortcoming of the data, we suspect it does not seriously confound our results because, as 
best we can ascertain, educational attainment is similar for male and female youth in the 
relevant cohorts in Lebanon.  The following text table reports school enrollment at 
various ages for male and female Lebanese youth in 1996, based on Figuié (1998).   
Age                            Males                  Females 
6-9                              83.7%                   83.9%                                    
10-14                          92.6                      93.6    
15-19                           59.3                     65.7 
20-24                           24.7                     24.9 
25-29                             6.0                       4.6 
 
Family poverty status, region of residence and age are also likely to be orthogonal to sex, 
so including data on young women in the sample without controlling for gender is 
unlikely to severely bias our estimates.   
Despite the limitations of both data sets, the samples provide some information on the 
characteristics of Hezbollah militants vis-à-vis the general population.  If nothing else, 
this exercise provides an illustration of the type of analysis that could be done to learn 
more about the characteristics of individuals who participate in organizations that use 
terrorist techniques.     23
Because the sample of 129 deceased Hezbollah fighters ranged in age from 15 to 38, 
we restricted the PHS sample to the 120,796 individuals age 15 to 38 as well.  Table 4 
presents summary statistics for the sample of deceased Hezbollah militants and the 
general population of Lebanon age 15 to 38.  For each variable, only observations with 
nonmissing data on that variable are used to construct the table, so the sample varies 
across rows.  (The PHS sample we were provided does not have any missing values.)   
Several findings are of interest.  First, notice that the poverty rate is 28 percent among 
the Hezbollah militants and 33 percent for the population – 5 points lower for members 
of the Hezbollah military wing, although the gap is not statistically significant.   
Second, in terms of education the Hezbollah fighters are more likely to have attended 
secondary school than are those in the general population, and a chi-square test indicates 
that the differences in the educational distributions between the Hezbollah and population 
samples are statistically significant.  Because, even in this restricted age range, the 
Hezbollah members are younger, the education differences would be even greater if 
individuals with the same age distribution were compared.   
Third, about one fifth of the Hezbollah sample was schooled in the Hezbollah 
education system.  Hurvitz (1998) reports that virtually all of the Hezbollah militants 
were Shiite Muslims.  Information on the religious affiliation of the Lebanese population 
is unavailable in the PHS.  According to the 2002 Gallup Survey of Lebanon, however, 
about 57 percent of Lebanese are Muslims and nearly 43 percent are Christians.  This 
also accords well with estimates in El Khoury and Panizza (2002).     24
Fourth, the Hezbollah fighters tended to be in their late teens and early 20s when they 
died.  Russell and Miller (1983) report that “the usual urban terrorist was between [age] 
22 and 25” in their sample of more than 350 terrorists from 18 different organizations. 
Fifth, the deceased Hezbollah fighters were more likely to reside in South Lebanon 
and Beirut than were members of the population.  This finding is not surprising given that 
the south of Lebanon is a stronghold of Hezbollah, and was the area occupied by Israeli 
forces.  Because educational attainment and living conditions are notably higher in Beirut 
than in the rest of Lebanon, it is important to try to control for regional differences in 
comparing the Hezbollah fighters to the general population.   
Table 5 provides logistic estimates using the pooled sample of Hezbollah and PHS 
observations.
10  The dependent variable equals one if the individual is a deceased 
Hezbollah fighter, and zero otherwise.  The first two columns simply present unweighted 
estimates for the pooled sample of Hezbollah fighters and the PHS data set.  However, 
this setup presents a classic problem of choice-based sampling: the Hezbollah militants 
were selected for inclusion in the sample on the basis of the dependent variable of the 
logit equation equaling one.  Consequently, the sample does not constitute a random 
sample, and the unweighted estimates will generally be inconsistent.  (See Manski and 
Lerner, 1977 for an exposition of choice-based sampling.)  Columns 3-4 present logit 
models in which the observations have been weighted by the estimated relative 
frequencies of the groups in the population to their relative frequencies in the sample, 
which should yield consistent estimates.  
                                                           
10 To maximize the sample size, the mean value of nonmissing values was assigned to observations with 
missing data for each variable in the Hezbollah sample.  This procedure is not ideal and has some 
undesirable properties (e.g., data may not be missing at random and the reported standard errors do not 
reflect the additional variability due to the imputations), but it provides a simple way to impute missing   25
Concentrating on the weighted estimates in columns (3) and (4), the results suggest 
that poverty is inversely related with the likelihood that someone becomes a Hezbollah 
fighter, and education is positively related with the likelihood that someone becomes a 
Hezbollah fighter.  The former effect is statistically significant at the 0.05 level, and the 
latter at the 0.10 level, when the equation excludes region dummies, but both coefficients 
become insignificant when region is held constant in column (4).  (The p-value for a joint 
test that poverty and education are unrelated to participation in Hezbollah in column (4) 
is 0.12.)  According to the coefficient in column (3), a 30 percentage point increase in the 
poverty rate is associated with a 10 percent reduction in participation in Hezbollah.  The 
same model implies that a 30 percentage point increase in the secondary school or higher 
attendance rate is associated with an 8 percent increase in participation in Hezbollah.  
These effects are 40 to 50 percent smaller in column (4), which adjusts for whether the 
individual resides in Beirut, South Lebanon or elsewhere in Lebanon.   
As suggested by the means in Table 4, residents of Beirut and southern Lebanon are 
more likely to join Hezbollah.  Also, even in the sample of 15 to 38 year olds, younger 
individuals are more likely to be represented in the deceased Hezbollah sample than in 
the population.  
Although we lack data on the population sample’s religious affiliation, and the 
Hezbollah participants were Shiite Muslims, to partially control for differences across 
religious groups we can restrict the sample to districts with a high proportion of Shiite 
Muslims.  El Khoury and Panizza (2002; Table 1) provide estimates of the percent of the 
Lebanese population belonging to various religious groups for 26 districts in the PHS, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
data.  A more sophisticated technique would multiply impute missing observations along the lines proposed 
by Rubin (1987).     26
based on voter registration from the 1996 national parliamentary elections.  We limit the 
PHS sample to the six districts in which at least 69 percent of the population is a Shiitie 
Muslim and to Beirut, because 42 percent of the Hezbollah militants were from Beirut.
11  
Columns (5) and (6) provide estimates for this geographic subsample.  The results 
indicate an even larger negative effect of poverty on the propensity to join Hezbollah in 
this subsample.  For this sample, which is arguably a more relevant one, a 30 percentage 
point reduction in poverty is associated with a 15 percent increase in participation in 
Hezbollah, based on column (6).  And a 30 percentage point increase in secondary school 
enrollment is associated with an 8 percent increase in Hezbollah participation.    
We regard these findings as suggestive but not definitive.  First, data limitations 
prevent us from drawing strong conclusions.  Second, the process of participation in 
Hezbollah, primarily a resistance organization, may not be representative of participation 
in other organizations that are more exclusively focused on terrorist activities.  
Nevertheless, these findings provide little support for the view that those who live in 
poverty or have a low level of education are disproportionately drawn to participate in 
terrorist activities.  It would be useful if future research could conduct this type of 
analysis for other groups and in other contexts.   
 
5.  Israeli Jewish Underground 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, numerous violent attacks against Palestinians 
were conducted by Israeli Jews in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, led most prominently 
                                                           
11 The six districts and percent of voters identified as Shiite Muslims are: Baalbek (69.1%); Bent-Jbayl 
(86.7%); El-Hermel (100%); El-Nabatiyye (99.3%); Marj'ayun (91.6%); and Sour/Tyre (91.8%).   In 
Beirut, 13.6 percent of voters were Shiite Muslims and 44.9 percent were Sunni Muslims.  We are grateful 
to Marianne El Khoury and Ugo Panizza for sharing these data with us.   27
by the Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful) group. These attacks included attempts to kill 
three Palestinian mayors of West Bank cities and failed attempts to blow up the Dome of 
the Rock Mosque, the third-holiest shrine of Islam.  From 1980 to 1984, a total of 23 
Palestinians were killed in attacks by the Jewish Underground, and 191 individuals were 
injured.  The International Encyclopedia of Terrorism (1997) refers to these attacks as 
terrorism.  In a ruling in 1985, an Israeli court convicted three Israeli settlers of murder 
and found others guilty of violent crimes in cases involving attacks in the West Bank. 
What were the biographical backgrounds of those involved in these violent 
attacks by Israeli Jewish extremists?  Table 6 reports the name, birth year, occupation and 
nature of underground activity for 27 individuals involved in the Jewish Underground in 
the early 1980s.  We think this list is fairly complete and accurate, as the main source is a 
book by Haggai Segal (1988), one of the members of the Underground.  It is clear that 
these Israeli extremists were overwhelmingly well educated and in high paying 
occupations.  The list includes teachers, writers, university students, geographers, an 
engineer, a combat pilot, a chemist, and a computer programmer.  As Neff (1999) 
observed of the three men convicted of murder, “All were highly regarded, well-
educated, very religious.”  Although we have not statistically compared the backgrounds 
of the extremists to the wider Israeli population, the group of individuals listed in Table 6 
certainly does not appear to be particularly underprivileged or undereducated.   
 
6.  Time-Series Analysis of Terrorism in Israel 
  A deterioration in economic conditions over time may be associated with the 
likelihood of terrorist incidents, even if cross-family differences in education and living 
conditions are unrelated with participation in terrorism.  Sandler and Enders (2001)   28
examine time trends in the number of various forms of transnational terrorist events, but  
do not relate economic conditions to the number of terrorist attacks.  To begin to fill this 
void, we briefly examined whether real GDP growth in the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
was related to the number of major terrorist incidents in Israel. 
  The number of major terrorist incidents each year was derived from the 
International Encyclopedia of Terrorism.  Between 1969 and 1996, there were 54 major 
terrorist attacks in Israel.  The number of attacks ranged from 0 to 7 a year.  We relate the 
number of attacks in a year to real GDP growth in the same year.  Because the terrorist 
attacks are a count variable, a linear regression model is inappropriate.  Consequently, we 
estimated a Poisson regression model.
12  The estimated bivariate relationship, with 
standard errors shown in parentheses, is as follows:  
 
        Log Number of Incidents   =  0.54  +  2.86 (Real GDP Growth) 
                                                      (0.16)    (1.41) 
 
The number of terrorist attacks moved pro-cyclically, not counter-cyclically, and the 
positive association is statistically significant.   
  The relationship is sensitive to the specification and inclusion of other variables, 
however.  For example, the number of terrorist incidents per year has trended 
significantly upward over this period.  If we include a linear time trend, GDP Growth 
becomes statistically insignificant (p-value=0.30), though it continues to have a positive 
effect.  Interestingly, the time trend becomes negative if GDP growth is held constant.  
More importantly, if we use one-year lagged GDP growth instead of contemporaneous 
GDP growth in the equation, economic growth is found to have an inverse but 
statistically insignificant (p-value = 0.30) bivariate relationship with the number of   29
terrorist incidents.  If we also include the linear time trend in the Poisson model, 
however, the negative effect of lagged GDP growth becomes statistically significant (p-
value=.02).   
We interpret these results as providing mixed evidence as to whether terrorist attacks 
tend to increase or decrease with economic growth.  Conducting this type of analysis on 
more countries and varying lag lengths, would be a useful exercise for future research.   
 
7.  Conclusion 
The evidence we have assembled and reviewed suggests there is little direct 
connection between poverty, education and participation in terrorism and politically 
motivated violence.  Indeed, the available evidence indicates that, compared with the 
relevant population, participants in Hezbollah’s militant wing in the late 1980s and early 
1990s were at least as likely to come from economically advantaged families and have a 
relatively high level of education as they were to come from impoverished families 
without educational opportunities.  We should caution, however, that the evidence we 
have considered is tentative due to data limitations.  In addition, our focus has been 
primarily on the Middle East, so our conclusions may not generalize to other regions or 
circumstances.    
Nevertheless, less quantitative studies of participants in a variety of forms of 
terrorism in several different settings have reached a conclusion similar to ours.  We are 
particularly struck by Russell and Miller’s (1983) work in this regard.  To derive a profile 
of terrorists, they assembled demographic information on more than 350 individuals 
engaged in terrorist activities in Latin America, Europe, Asia and the Middle East from 
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1966 to 1976 based on newspaper reports.  Their sample consisted of individuals from 18 
revolutionary groups known to engage in urban terrorism, including the Red Army in 
Japan, Baader-Meinhof Gang in Germany, Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland, 
Red Brigades in Italy and People’s Liberation Army in Turkey.  Russell and Miller found 
that, “… the vast majority of those individuals involved in terrorist activities as cadres or 
leaders is quite well educated. In fact, approximately two-thirds of those identified 
terrorists are persons with some university training, university graduates or postgraduate 
students.”  They also report that more than two-thirds of arrested terrorists “came from 
the middle or upper classes in their respective nations or areas.”   
Taylor (1988) likewise concludes from his survey of the literature that, “Neither 
social background, educational opportunity or attainment seem to be particularly 
associated with terrorism.”  Similarly, we show that members of the Israeli Jewish 
Underground who terrorized Palestinian civilians in the late 1970s and early 1980s were 
overwhelmingly well educated and in highly regarded occupations.  Although other 
research has not systematically compared the backgrounds of those involved in terrorism 
to that of the general population, these findings suggest that most terrorists do not tend to 
have underprivileged backgrounds, and that this conclusion is not limited to Hezbollah. 
While economic deprivation may not be associated with participation in terrorism and 
politically motivated violence at the individual level, it may nonetheless matter at the 
national level.  For example, if a country is impoverished, a minority of the relatively 
well off in that country may turn to terrorism to seek to improve conditions of their 
countrymen.  One might question, however, whether the end goal of many terrorist 
organizations is to install a political regime that is likely to reduce poverty.  In addition,   31
there are well documented cases of terrorism in economically advanced countries (e.g., 
Ireland, Spain, Italy), so it is far from clear that poverty at a national level is associated 
with support for terrorism.  Nevertheless, this question can only be addressed by cross-
country analyses.  
In addition, poverty may indirectly affect terrorism through the apparent connection 
between economic conditions and the proclivity for countries to undergo civil wars.  
Fearon and Laitin (2001) find that GDP per capita is inversely related to the onset of civil 
war, and Collier and Hoeffler (2000) find that the growth rate of GDP per capita and 
male secondary school enrollment rate are inversely related to the incidence of civil war.  
Lebanon, Afghanistan and the Sudan are high-profile examples of countries where civil 
war provided a hospitable environment for international terrorists to operate.  There are 
other situations, however, where countries undergoing a civil war did not provide a 
breeding ground for international terrorism, so it is unclear how much one should 
extrapolate from the relationship between economic development and civil war.  And 
terrorism has arisen in many countries that were not undergoing a civil war.  Before too 
much is inferred about terrorism from the relationship between civil war and poverty, we 
think it would be useful for future research to directly examine the relationship between 
terrorist incidents and GDP at the national level, using similar cross-country analyses to 
those used in the literature on civil wars.   
Enough evidence is accumulating that it is fruitful to begin to conjecture why 
participation in terrorism and political violence is apparently unrelated, or positively 
related, to individuals’ income and education.  The standard economic model of crime 
suggests that those with the lowest value of time should engage in criminal activity.  But   32
we would hypothesize that in most cases terrorism is less like property crime and more 
like a violent form of political engagement.  More educated people from privileged 
backgrounds are more likely to participate in politics, probably in part because political 
involvement requires some minimum level of interest, expertise, commitment to issues 
and effort, all of which are more likely if people are educated and wealthy enough to 
concern themselves with more than mere economic subsistence.  These factors could 
outweigh the effect of opportunity cost on individuals’ decisions to become involved in 
terrorism.   
The demand side for terrorists must be considered as well as the supply side.  
Terrorist organizations may prefer highly educated individuals over less educated ones, 
even for homicide suicide bomb attacks.  In addition, educated, middle or upper class 
individuals are better suited to carry out acts of international terrorism than are 
impoverished illiterates because the terrorists must fit into a foreign environment to be 
successful.  This consideration suggests that terrorists who threaten economically 
developed countries will disproportionately be drawn from the ranks of the relatively well 
off and highly educated.   
On the whole, we conclude that there is little reason to be optimistic that a reduction 
in poverty or increase in educational attainment will lead to a meaningful reduction in the 
amount of international terrorism, without other changes.  Stern (2000) observes that 
many madrasahs, or religious schools, in Pakistan are funded by wealthy industrialists, 
and that these schools deliberately educate students to become foot soldiers and elite 
operatives in various extremist movements around the world.  She further reports that, 
“Most madrasahs offer only religious instruction, ignoring math, science, and other   33
secular subjects important for functioning in modern society.”  These observations 
suggest that, to use education as part of a strategy to reduce terrorism, the international 
community should not limit itself to increasing years of schooling but should consider the 
content of education.     34
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 Table 1: Results of December 19-24, 2001 PCPSR Poll of West Bank and Gaza Strip, by Occcupation and Employment Status
Question








Q15. Do you believe that the bin 
Laden group is the one that 
hijacked the American planes 
and destroyed the Twin Towers in 
New York on 11 September? Yes or Definitely Yes 25.6% 14.4% 16.0% 16.7% 12.3%
No or Definitely No 53.8% 63.0% 56.6% 68.3% 64.5%
No Opinion 20.5% 22.6% 27.4% 15.0% 23.2%
Q16. In your opinion, are there 
any circumstances under which 
you would justify the use of 
terrorism to achieve political 
goals? Yes or Definitely Yes 41.0% 34.6% 36.0% 43.3% 38.4%
No or Definitely No 49.6% 58.0% 50.6% 48.3% 54.3%
No Opinion 9.4% 7.3% 13.4% 8.3% 7.2%
Q17. Do you believe that armed 
attacks against Israeli civilians 
inside Israel so far have achieved 
Palestinian rights in a way that 
negotiations could not? Yes or Definitely Yes 66.7% 66.4% 58.2% 64.2% 63.8%
No or Definitely No 31.6% 31.5% 37.2% 29.2% 36.2%
No Opinion 1.7% 2.1% 4.6% 6.7% 0.0%Question








Q18. Concerning armed attacks 
against Israeli targets, I…. Support or Strongly Support 89.7% 80.8% 82.0% 86.7% 73.9%
Oppose or Strongly Oppose 9.4% 16.0% 15.7% 10.0% 23.9%
No Opinion 0.9% 3.1% 2.3% 3.3% 2.2%
Q21. Would you support or 
oppose a UN international 
initiative to fight terrorism ? Support or Strongly Support 38.5% 34.9% 27.9% 35.0% 33.3%
Oppose or Strongly Oppose 59.0% 60.9% 63.9% 60.0% 63.8%
No Opinion 2.6% 4.2% 8.2% 5.0% 2.9%
Q22-5.To what extent do you 
agree or disagree to define the 
following event as a terrorist 
event: "The killing of 21 Israeli 
youths by a Palestinian who 
exploded himself at the 
Dolphinarium night club in Tel 
Aviv" Agree or Strongly Agree 12.0% 14.4% 15.9% 12.5% 18.1%
Disagree or Strongly Disagree 87.2% 81.9% 82.7% 80.8% 79.7%
No Opinion 0.9% 3.7% 1.4% 6.7% 2.2%
Q28. Concerning armed attacks 
against Israeli soldiers in the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 
I…. Support or Strongly Support 95.7% 93.4% 91.3% 94.2% 89.9%
Oppose or Strongly Oppose 3.4% 5.0% 7.9% 4.2% 9.4%
No Opinion 0.9% 1.6% 0.9% 1.7% 0.7%
Notes: Sample size is 117 for students, 381 for laborers, craftsment and employees, 562 for housewives, 120 for merchants, farmers 
and professionals, and 138 for unemployed.  Percentages may not add up to 100 because of rounding.  Table 2: Results of December 19-24, 2001 PCPSR Poll of West Bank and Gaza Strip, by Educational Attainment
Level of Schooling:
Question    Illiterate Elementary   Middle Secondary Post-Secondary
Q15. Do you believe that the bin Laden 
group is the one that hijacked the 
American planes and destroyed the Twin 
Towers in New York on 11 September? Yes or Definitely Yes 4.9% 11.6% 19.3% 18.8% 18.5%
No or Definitely No 58.0% 61.4% 58.8% 58.4% 65.9%
No Opinion 37.0% 27.1% 21.9% 22.8% 15.7%
Q16. In your opinion, are there any 
circumstances under which you would 
justify the use of terrorism to achieve 
political goals? Yes or Definitely Yes 32.3% 37.5% 36.9% 39.4% 36.4%
No or Definitely No 45.3% 53.4% 55.3% 51.4% 56.7%
No Opinion 22.4% 9.2% 7.8% 9.2% 6.9%
Q17. Do you believe that armed attacks 
against Israeli civilians inside Israel so far 
have achieved Palestinian rights in a way 
that negotiations could not? Yes or Definitely Yes 56.8% 63.3% 64.8% 63.3% 59.9%
No or Definitely No 36.4% 33.1% 32.9% 34.2% 37.4%
No Opinion 6.8% 3.6% 2.3% 2.4% 2.8%Table 2 -- Continued Level of Schooling:
Question    Illiterate Elementary   Middle Secondary Post-Secondary
Q18. Concerning armed attacks against 
Israeli targets, I…. Support or Strongly Support 72.2% 80.5% 82.1% 86.1% 81.5%
Oppose or Strongly Oppose 25.9% 17.5% 15.3% 12.0% 13.9%
No Opinion 1.9% 2.0% 2.6% 1.9% 4.6%
Q21. Would you support or oppose a UN 
international initiative to fight terrorism? Support or Strongly Support 23.6% 29.5% 32.0% 33.0% 42.4%
Oppose or Strongly Oppose 55.9% 65.7% 63.7% 64.0% 54.4%
No Opinion 20.5% 4.8% 4.3% 3.0% 3.2%
Q22-5 To what extent do you agree or 
disagree to define the following event as a 
terrorist event:  "The killing of 21 Israeli 
youths by a Palestinian who exploded 
himself at the Dolphinarium night club in 
Tel Aviv"  Agree or Strongly Agree 16.1% 18.8% 13.8% 13.6% 13.5%
Disagree or Strongly Disagree 78.3% 80.4% 84.1% 84.0% 83.3%
No Opinion 5.6% 0.8% 2.0% 2.4% 3.2%
Education Distribution 12.0% 18.7% 25.8% 27.4% 16.1%























Jul/Aug 1998 26 37.5% 31.2% 50.8% 29.2%
Oct 1998 29
Nov 1998 24








Feb 2000 19 43.3 24.6 55.8 27.2
Mar/Apr 2000 17
Dec 2001 21
Source: PCPSR polls conducted at various times.  Poll results are available from 
www.pcpsr.org/survey/cprspolls/index.html.  Table 4: Characteristics of Hezbollah Militants (Shahid) and Lebanese Population of
Similar Age
Deceased Lebanese
Hezbollah        Population
Characteristic Militants Age 15-38
< Poverty 28% 33% p-value for chi-sq test =0.489
Education
Illiterate 0% 6%
Read and write  22% 7%
Primary  17% 23%
Preparatory  14% 26%
Secondary  33% 23%
University  13% 14%
High Studies  1% 1% p-value for chi-sq test =0.000
Age 
      Mean        22.17 25.57
      [std. dev.]  (3.99)  (6.78)
       15-17      2% 15%
       18-20  41% 14%
       21-25      42% 23%
       26-30      10% 20%
       31-38        5% 28% p-value for chi-sq test =0.000
       




Beirut       42% 13%
Mount Lebanon 0% 36%
Bekaa       26% 13%
Nabatieh       2% 6%
South       30% 10%






Notes: Sample size for Lebanese population sample is 120,796.  Sample size 
for Hezbollah is 50 for poverty status, 78 for education, 81 for age (measured at  
death, 129 for education in Hezbollah system, 116 for region of residence, and
75 for marital status.  Chi-square test refers to a test of the null hypothesis
that the characteristic is independent of Hezbollah status.  Table 5: Logistic Estimates of Participation in Hezbollah
Dependent Variable is 1 if Individual is a Deceased Hezbollah Militant, and 0 Otherwise
Standard errors shown in parentheses
         All of Lebanon: Heavily Shiite Regions:
  Unweighted Estimates Weighted Estimates   Weighted Estimates
      (1)       (2)     (3)      (4)     (5)      (6)
Intercept -4.886 -5.910 -5.965 -6.991 -4.658 -5.009
(0.365) (0.391) (0.230) (0.255) (0.232) (0.261)
Attended Secondary  0.281 0.171 0.281 0.170 0.220 0.279
School or Higher (1=yes)  (0.191) (0.193) (0.159) (0.164) (0.159) (0.167)
Poverty (1=yes) -0.335 -0.167 -0.335 -0.167 -0.467 -0.500
(0.221) (0.223) (0.158) (0.162) (0.159) (0.166)
Age -0.083 -0.083 -0.083 -0.083 -0.083 -0.082
(0.015) (0.015) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Beirut (1=yes) --- 2.199 --- 2.200 --- 0.168
(0.219) (0.209) (0.222)
South Lebanon --- 2.187 --- 2.187 --- 1.091
(1=yes) (0.232) (0.221) (0.221)
Pseudo R-Square 0.020 0.091 0.018 0.080 0.021 0.033
Sample Size 120,925 120,925 120,925 120,925 34,826 34,826
Notes: Sample pools together observations on 129 deceased Hezbollah fighters and the general Lebanese
population from 1996 PHS.  Weights used in columns (3) and (4) are the relative share of Hezbollah 
militants in the population to their share in the sample and relative share of PHS respondents in the 
sample to their share in the population.  Weight is 0.273 for Hezbollah sample and .093 for PHS sample.Table 6: Characteristics of Israeli Jewish Underground Terrorists in Early 1980s
Name
Year of 
Birth Occupation Underground Activity
Katriel Avinoam >1965 Army officer Related to the conspiracy attempt to blow 
up the Dome of the Rock Mosque 1980.
Dan Be'eri 1945 Established an 
elemetary school in 
Kiryat Arba, founder 
of the Barkai 
educational method
Related to the conspiracy attempt to blow 
up the Dome of the Rock Mosque, 1980 
(left the group in 1982).
Haim Ben-David 1952 Geography and 
history expert 
Related to the conspiracy attempt to blow 
up the dome of the rock mosque 1980-82, 
and participated in the attack on the 
National Guidance Committee 1980.
Yeshua Ben-Shushan 1946 NA Instigated the conspiracy attempt to blow 
up the Dome of the Rock Mosque 1980.
Yehuda Cohen NA Yeshiva student Carried out the reconnaissance on the 
Temple Mount.
Yossi Edri NA Electrician Participated in the acquisition of the 
clocks used in the attempt to blow up Arab 
buses (April 27, 1984).
Yehuda Etzion 1951 Farmer and writer Prime mover of the Dome of the Rock 
conspiracy and key figure in the attack on 
the mayors.
Yitzhak Ganiram (Akaleh) 1945 Teacher and special 
education teacher for 
learning disabled 
youth
Participated in the attack on the mayors, 
offered limited assistance in the Dome of 
the Rock conspiracy. Let the perpatrators 
of the Islamic College killings use his car.
Aaron (Roni) Gilo NA Army captain Not member of the Underground. But 
used his military position to aid those 
involved in the attack on the mayors.
Benzion (Bentz) 
Heineman
1936 Religious scholar and 
farmer
Helped carry out the technical 
preparations of several underground 
operations.
Boaz Heineman The owner of a farm 
and carpentry shop
Prepared explosives for the underground.
ContinuedTable 6 -- Continued
Yaakov Heineman 1948 Air force combat pilot 
and a farmer.
Played a limited role in the conspiracy 
attempt to blow up the Dome of the Rock 
Mosque, 1980.
Shlomo Liviatan NA Officer in the Judeans 
Samaria Army 
headquarters
Played a limited role in the attack of the 
mayors.
Menachem Livni 1950 Engineer Participated in planning all operations 
associated with the underground.
Uri Meier NA Farmer  Participated in the aborted attack on 
Bethlehem's Dr. Natshe.
Natan Natanson 1957 NA Involved in the attack on the mayors.
Menachem Neuberger 1965 Yeshiva student Participated in the intelligence gathering 
stage of the attack on the mayors.
Barak Nir NA Teacher  Participated in the attack on the Islamic 
College and in the attempt to sabotage 
the Arab buses.
Shaul Nir 1954 Engineer Involved in the Islamic College killings and 
initiated the attempt to sabotage the Arab 
buses
Yitzchak Novik 1948 Chemist, farmer Participated in the attack on the mayors.
Gilad Peli NA Farmer and Israel 
geography expert.
Helped in the attack on the mayors; 
helped in the Dome of the Rock 
conspiracy.
Era Rappaport 1948 NA Participated in the attack on the mayors.
Hagai Segal  1957 Reporter and 
university student
Participated in the attack on the mayors.
Uzi Sharbaf 1960 Physical education 
teacher
Involved in the Islamic College killings and 
initiated the attempt to sabotage the Arab 
buses.
Yosef Tzuria 1959 Computer 
programmer
Related to the conspiracy attempt to blow 
up the Dome of the Rock Mosque.
Noam Yinon 1957 Farmer Convicted of supplying explosives to Livni 
and Shaul.
Moshe Zar 1937 Land dealer Was the driver in the attack on the 
mayors.
Sources: Black and Morris (1991); Friedman (1992); Neff (1999) and Segal (1988).